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Canadian Antitrust Aspects of Competing in Foreign Markets
Warren Grover*
To understand Canada's approach to antitrust, whether in the domestic
or in the foreign markets, one must appreciate that the economy of
Canada is fundamentally different from the economy of most other coun-
tries and notably from the economy of the United States. Canada is
heavily dependent on exports and imports. Fully 30% of our gross do-
mestic product in goods is exported and about the same proportion of
our consumption of goods is imported. If one looks at the statistics on
trade balances one will find that Canada has a very healthy trade balance
in goods, but if one looks at other sectors, such as services and payments
of interest and dividends one will find that our total balance of payments
is not in good shape. There is a deficit each year. Similarly, if one looks
at what Canada exports one will find that Canada has a tremendous vol-
ume of exports of raw or primary material, amounting to 65% of our
exports, which represents a substantial excess over imports in the same
category. On the other hand, in engineering products, we have a sub-
stantial trade imbalance the other way. To put these figures in context,
the U.S. domestic economy accounts for about 90% of its national in-
come with only 10% attributable to international commerce. So far as
Canada is concerned, the United States is a net importer of raw materials
and a net importer of finished goods. The United States also represents
about 70% of Canada's international trade while Canada represents
about 20% of the U.S. international trade.1 The Canadian economy
then, does not look like the American economy and the view of antitrust
is not the same. The relative importance of international markets, partic-
ularly the U.S. market, is much greater from a Canadian perspective.
Canada also has had more government participation in its economy
than is true in the United States. Many of our industries have, as one of
the players, either a federally or a provincially owned entity. Examples
include integrated oil companies, steel companies, telecommunications
carriers, railroads, medical supplies and broadcasting. In other areas, the
government is the dominant or only participant. The most common ex-
amples are the various government controlled hydroelectric utilities.
Also, Canada has generally accepted regulation with more equanimity
than one finds in the United States. Direct government involvement in
* Member of law firm of Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto, Ontario.
I All the above statistics are derived from J. QUINN, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ENVIRON-
MENT (1986).
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the economy, then, is more accepted, more part of the Canadian way of
life than it is in the United States. It is not surprising therefore, that
regulated industries are generally thought to be exempt from antitrust
legislation. Canada's version of the Norr-Pennington doctrine is much
wider.
Nor is it surprising that the chief concern with respect to foreign
markets is that they remain hospitable to Canadian exports. Thus, Can-
ada is far more worried about the protectionists measures, so common in
the United States, than it is with antitrust laws, whether U.S. or Cana-
dian. At the 1986 Fordham Antitrust Lectures, Daniel Oliver stated that
import restraints on steel alone could cost the U.S. consumers $15 to $18
billion through the end of this decade. Canada is one of the countries
affected by those import restraints.
Similarly, Canada views with some alarm the countervailing duty,
dumping, customs procedures, state or local buy-state or buy-America
preferences and the escape clause embodied in section 201 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974.2 While antitrust is aimed at the behaviour of private
entities, the major Canadian worry is government intervention so far as
"foreign" markets are concerned. Antitrust is essentially better confined
to the domestic market. Let me come back then and review with you the
extent to which Canada views as permissible the application of antitrust
laws in foreign markets.
I. EXTRATERRITORIALrrY
The antitrust laws of both Canada and the United States are based
on the premise that a competitive market will deliver to ultimate con-
sumers the products that they need and want at prices they can afford.
To the extent that behaviour abroad interferes with that competitive
market, there is logic in the antitrust or other laws trying to reach out to
castigate that behaviour. However, there is also a question of sovereignty
and of comity between nations which should not be forgotten in any logi-
cal analysis. While the Lotus decision' gives some international law stat-
ure to an "effects" approach in the reach of domestic criminal law, the
basic Canadian view is that criminal law is territorial and that states have
little interest in prohibiting activities that occur abroad and they are, as
well, hesitant to incur the displeasure of other states.4 In the 1986 Ford-
ham lectures, Eleanor Fox said that the U.S. law on extraterritoriality is
neither so extravagant nor so incoherent as some have charged. It is, she
said, "rather reasonable and temperate." It would be difficult to find
many scholars outside the United States who agree with that view.
Whether it is antitrust abroad or protectionism at home, the view of most
2 See Ince, Problems of Exporting to the United States-An American Perspective, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (J. Ziegel & W. Graham eds. 1980).
3 Lotus (Parties to the case abbrev.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Set. A.) No. 10.
4 Libman v. The Queen, [1985], 21 D.L.R. 4th 174, 178.
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commentators outside the United States is to see U.S. law and policy as
founded on no more logical a basis than what benefits the U.S. economy
is what the rest of the world should accept.
A recent antitrust dispute between Canada, Britain, Australia and
France on one side and the United States on the other is a good example.
This is the celebrated uranium cartel case. What happened in the ura-
nium cartel case, from a Canadian point of view, was that the United
States closed the U.S. market to imports of uranium from foreign coun-
tries in order to protect its domestic producers, an act which, in the view
of some commentators, violated the U.S. obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").5 As the United States was
by far the largest consumer of uranium, this unilateral act by the U.S.
Government caused enormous dislocation in the markets outside the
United States and forced the governments of the uranium producing
countries to take strong measures in order to avoid a collapse of their
domestic industries. The result was the establishment outside the United
States of marketing arrangements involving many uranium producers,
with the encouragement of various governmental authorities. Mean-
while, back in the United States, a U.S. corporation made an unfortunate
series of commercial decisions in deciding not to obtain secure sources of
supply for long-term delivery contract obligations to nuclear plants
which it had constructed. It therefore had to go out and buy uranium
and found that the price was much higher than it had anticipated.
Rather than blame itself or the U.S. Government, it blamed the world
cartel and sought a multi-billion dollar civil damage suit against the for-
eign producers. From the viewpoint of the foreign countries involved,
any damage that was caused to the U.S. entity was caused, albeit indi-
rectly, by the violation of international obligations undertaken by the
Government of the United States of America. The U.S. antitrust law
that facilitated the prosecution of the suit was viewed as overreaching by
the governments and the courts of both the United Kingdom6 and Can-
ada,7 jurisdictions which are normally staunch allies of the United States.
Canada and the United Kingdom have not been the only countries
to disagree with the U.S. approach. The French Government was in-
censed over the treatment accorded the "Potasses d'Alsace" in 1929.8
The Dutch Ambassador registered an official protest in the American
courts in a case involving incandescent lamps.9 A grand jury investiga-
tion into the practices of foreign shipping conferences led to official pro-
tests from various affected nations. 0
Canada has normally taken a very conservative attitude with respect
5 See Graham, The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, 11 CAN. Bus. L.J. 410 (1986).
6 In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H of L).
7 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., [1908] 2 S.C.R. 39.
8 United States v. Deutches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (1929).
9 United States v. General Electric, 115 F. Supp. 835 (1953).
10 Verzijl, The Controversy Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial Effect of the American An-
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to the jurisdictional reach of its own laws. Normally Canadian courts
require that at least some of the constituent elements of the offence occur
within Canada as a prerequisite for asserting jurisdiction. In the anti-
trust field there are no examples of which I am aware where the courts
have even been asked to consider behaviour outside of Canada. In the
Phosphorus Products Report of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion, a Canadian subsidiary, which had a monopoly in the production
and sale of one type of phosphorus in Canada, entered into a "Hunting
Ground Agreement" with other producers around the world, effectively
dividing up various markets. The Commission said:
In addition to the Hunting Ground Agreement there were other
arrangements, in some of which Erco participated, limiting competi-
tion in the sale of phosphorus. In August 1959, before the Hunting
Ground Agreement was negotiated, Imperial Chemical Industries and
Ereo (through Duff) took turns in filling orders for red phosphorus
from Makina in Turkey. Duff paid a commission to I.C.I. on sales to
India and to China before the communists assumed control on the
mainland. I.C.I. did not participate in the Hunting Ground
Agreement.
None of these manoeuvres had any measurable effect upon the
Canadian consumer. The Hunting Ground Agreement which appar-
ently enjoyed indifferent success because of Japanese competition, in-
volved only red phosphorus used in the match industry. Dr. Jones
testified that the agreement concerned sales to countries where there
was no domestic production and had no reference to Canada. Presum-
ably if the signatories to the Hunting Ground Agreement could agree
not to challenge each other in their respective export territories, they
would be safe from each other's competition in red phosphorus in their
home markets. However, the Canadian market for this product is
small ($19,000 in 1959) and Dr. Jones testified that European red
phosphorus would have to be dumped to overcome the Canadian tariff
of 20 percent [sic]. It is not likely that the Hunting Ground Agree-
ment was intended to have, or had, any effect upon the Canadian
market. 1
This is the closest any antitrust tribunal in Canada has come to sug-
gesting that actions abroad might be of interest if they had an impact on
the domestic market.
So far as court decisions are concerned, the Canadian jurisprudence
is scant in the antitrust area, but there are some decisions in other areas
that are indicative of our approach. Perhaps the most informative case is
a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in a securities fraud
case.12 The facts in the case were simple. A man named Libman hired
titrust Laws, 8 NETH. INT'L. L. REv. 3 (1961). The three examples in notes 7, 8 and 9 are all cited
by Graham, supra, note 5.
11 PHOSPHORUS PRODUCTS REP. OF THE RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRAC. COMMISSION, RE-
sTRIcr TRADE PRACTCE REPORT No. 41 at 101 (1966).
12 Libman, 21 D.L.R. 4th at 174.
Vol. 14:93 1988
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employees who were instructed to telephone U.S. residents from
Libman's place of business in Toronto and convince them to buy shares
in a Honduras or Panamanian company. The companies were worthless
and misrepresentations were made routinely in order to encourage in-
vestment. The money was sent by the U.S. residents to associates of
Libman in Panama or Honduras and Libman visited those countries in
order to pick up his slice of the profits. When faced with a criminal pros-
ecution for fraud Libman claimed that the court was without jurisdiction
as the deceit was practiced on people outside Canada and the money was
sent to Panama or Honduras.
Mr. Justice LaForest reviewed the earlier jurisprudence and noted
that the English courts in the 1960s, led by the writings of a leading
academic, Glanville Williams, tried to look for one jurisdiction as being
the appropriate jurisdiction in which to try the offence, namely the juris-
diction where the gravamen of the offence was committed.13 However
the English courts broadened their approach in the 1970s, coming closer
to an "effects" doctrine, when an actor, who had committed acts abroad,
injured U.K. citizens within the United Kingdom and subsequently re-
turned to England.14 He concluded that, in a shrinking world, we are all
our brothers' keepers and all that is necessary to make an offence subject
to the jurisdiction of a Canadian court was that a significant portion of
the activities constituting the offence took place in Canada.
This approach is clearly a long way from the approach adopted by
Judge Hand in the Alcoa case, 5 where a Canadian national, which was
found to have operated at arms length from its U.S. affiliate, was still
subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts when it specifically
intended to affect exports into the United States. While some American
courts have recently adopted a reasonableness test in asserting jurisdic-
tion where foreign activities are concerned, 6 there are many cases going
the other way.' 7 Generally, overreaching by U.S. courts is a standard
complaint of academic writers and judges outside the United States.
For example, the perceived overreaching by the American courts in
the uranium cartel cases resulted in the Canadian Cabinet adopting the
Uranium Information Security Regulations to prevent the disclosure of
information concerning uranium marketing arrangements for the pur-
poses of a foreign tribunal. It also resulted in the enactment of the For-
eign Extraterritorial Measures Act. 8 This new law contains four
elements:
13 This is not unlike the approach of Mr. Justice Holmes in American Banana v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
14 Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] App. Cas. 537.
15 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
16 Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) appears to be the
seminal case introducing the new approach.
17 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) is a clear example.
18 1984 Can. Stat. 49.
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1) It permits the Attorney General to prohibit the furnishing of
documents or records before a foreign tribunal. This type of provision is
often referred to as a "gag" or "blocking" law.
2) It permits the Attorney General to prohibit persons from com-
plying in Canada with foreign government or court orders or policy
directives.
3) It permits the Attorney General to declare that a judgment of a
foreign court is not enforceable in Canada or, in the case of a money
judgment, to reduce the amount. This is to get rid of the treble damage
awards of American courts.
4) It permits a Canadian, that has paid an antitrust judgment
abroad, to recover any amount that the Attorney General has alleged to
be "excessive" from the Canadian assets of the successful foreign suitor.
This statute, while very explicitly aimed at extraterritoriality in
American antitrust cases, is simply the culmination of concepts already
contained in the Competition Act. Thus section 31.5 of the Act provides
that, upon application by the Director of Investigation and Research, the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission may, after a hearing, if it finds
that a foreign judgment can be implemented in Canada, in whole or in
part, and the implementation of the judgment would have certain adverse
effects on Canadian competition, trade or industry, order that the judg-
ment not be implemented in Canada, or that it be implemented only in
the manner prescribed by the Commission.
In the context of a proceeding pursuant to section 31.5, the Com-
mission will consider whether the implementation of the judgment would
adversely affect competition in Canada; adversely affect the efficiency of
trade or industry in Canada without bringing about or increasing in Can-
ada competition that would restore or improve such efficiency; adversely
affect the foreign trade of Canada without compensating advantages, or
otherwise restrain or injure trade or commerce in Canada without com-
pensating advantages.
Although this provision could be used to block the implementation
of a foreign judgment with an anti-competitive impact, the section is
somewhat oddly placed in an antitrust law, since it could also be used to
block enforcement of a foreign antitrust order. In reality, the primary
focus of the section is the protection of Canadian sovereignty, rather than
the prumotion cf competition.
Section 31.6 is similar to section 31.5, except that it is aimed at the
implementation of foreign laws and at directives, instructions, policies
and other communications from foreign governments and from persons
in foreign countries, such as parent corporations, who are in a position to
direct or influence the policies of a person or company in Canada.
Section 31.6 could be used to prevent the implementation in Canada
of an anti-competitive directive from an American parent to a Canadian
subsidiary. However, like section 31.5, its primary focus is sovereignty,
Vol. 14:93 1988
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rather than competition. In 1982, when the United States amended the
Export Administration Regulations to prevent foreign subsidiaries of
American companies from exporting equipment for the Siberian gas
pipeline, the Director of Investigation and Research commenced an in-
quiry with a view to applying to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion for an order under section 31.6 directing that no measures be taken
in Canada by a Canadian company to implement the U.S. regulations.
The matter was then resolved through diplomatic channels so the case
never came ahead.
In addition, section 31.6 and section 32.1 deal with cases where a
foreign person who is in a position to influence the policies of a Canadian
person or company directs the Canadian to give effect to a conspiracy
entered into outside Canada. By virtue of section 31.6, the Commission
may order that no measures be taken in Canada to implement the direc-
tive. By virtue of section 32.1 it is an offence for a corporation carrying
on business in Canada to implement such a directive.
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has been the
subject of long standing disagreement with Canada. In 1959, the Attor-
ney General of the United States, William Rogers, and the Canadian
Minister of Justice, Davie Fulton, reached an informal agreement on
consultative procedure between the two countries. This is known as the
Fulton-Rogers Understanding of 1959. It provides for the holding of dis-
cussions between the two governments when it becomes apparent that
interests in one country are likely to be affected by the enforcement of the
antitrust laws of the other. The purpose of such discussions is to explore
means to avoid objections or misunderstanding in the other country.
The cooperation between antitrust officials which flowed from this Un-
derstanding served to diminish to a large extent the problems brought
about by the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law at that time.
In 1969, discussions were held between Ron Basford, Canadian
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and John Mitchell, Attor-
ney General of the United states, with a view to confirming and ex-
tending the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, and to relate it to the 1967
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development recommenda-
tion on restrictive business practices. Aside from reaffirming the notifica-
tion and consultation procedure agreed to in 1959, the Basford-Mitchell
Understanding provides for the exchange of information between anti-
trust authorities, and provides that the antitrust enforcement agencies of
the two countries, each within its own jurisdiction will, where possible,
coordinate the eaforzetm,-t of their respective laws against the restrictive
business practices of multinational corporations affecting international
trade. Their meeting resulted in an agreement upon certain basic princi-
ples for guidance to officials for negotiating a more formal and strength-
ened notification and consultation procedure in antitrust cases affecting
national interests. Finally, in 1984 a "Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
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ernment of Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws" was signed.
However, that Memorandum does not extend to private antitrust pro-
ceedings which have often been the chief problem in disputes between the
two countries over the antitrust laws.
II. EXPORT CARTELS
Both the United States and Canada have shown an increasing inter-
est in the export markets as trade is liberalized around the world. The
competition legislation in both countries contains provisions conferring a
limited degree of antitrust immunity on firms who combine forces for the
purposes of effecting sales in foreign markets on a basis which, if under-
taken in the domestic market, might otherwise expose those firms to
prosecution or liability.19 The Canadian provisions work as an exception
to the general prohibition against the conspiracy offences. Thus, subsec-
tion 32(4) provides that, in a conspiracy prosecution, the court shall not
convict the accused if the conspiracy relates only to the export of prod-
ucts from Canada. This exemption from prosecution is qualified in that
the exemption will not apply if the conspiracy has resulted in (or is likely
to result in) a reduction or limitation of the real value of exports of a
product, has restricted any person from entering into or expanding the
business of exporting products from Canada or has lessened competition
unduly in the supply of services facilitating the export of products from
Canada. While these provisions have never been tested in the courts, it is
quite clear that Canada is prepared to allow conduct among domestic
nationals that only impacts on exports, that would not be countenanced
in the domestic market. This provision is not a great favourite of the
academics who believe that competition law is a question of policy and
not a question of geography in a sense of "beggar your neighbour."
Since 1918 when the Webb-Pomerene Act was introduced, foreign-
ers have believed that the United States was attempting to limit the scope
of antitrust application for their own nationals so far as it related to the
export trade, although the scope of the limitation was not clearly under-
stood. In 1975, the Canadian Government commissioned Corwin Ed-
wards, then professor emeritus of the University of Oregon, to prepare a
summary of the real impact of the statute so the Canadian Government
could consider it when introducing the 1976 statutory amendments.2 °
Edwards explained, among other things, that the export associations
were not limited to nationals or residents of the United States and could
include non-nationals reaching the same market, provided the market
was not a domestic market of the United States and that some U.S. enter-
prise was involved. Initially, any impact on domestic prices that was
19 J.T. KENNISH, COMPETITION ISSUES ARISING FROM FREE TRADE-A CANADIAN PRACTI-
TIONER'S PERSPECTIVE (1986).
20 1 C. EDWARDS, STUDIES OF FOREIGN COMPETITION POLICY AND PRACTICE (1976).
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incidental or inconsequential was also not condemned. However, this
approach, according to Edwards, was varied in the period 1940-50 to
ensure that foreign export associations did not work with foreign cartels
to allocate markets or stabilize domestic prices. Ultimately, the Commis-
sion made available to associations mimeographed lists of prohibited and
permitted activities. The lists were derived from particular cases com-
piled over a decade and certain inconsistencies appeared that deprived
them of full coherence. Nevertheless, they were very effective and Can-
ada considered following that approach but decided against it. Similarly,
export associations were always registered under the Webb-Pomerene
provision and are still registered under the Export Trading Company
Act, but Canada has not followed this registration concept either. Ed-
wards stated that concern was expressed in the United States about
whether the exemption applied to sales abroad when the sales were made
to the U.S. Government or to foreign buyers who used funds supplied by
the U.S. Government. The answer was a resounding negative in the
United States, but the Canadian Government has ignored the issue.21
Registration is perhaps the most important missing concept of the
Canadian provisions compared to their U.S. counterparts. Canada has
no concept of registration of trade associations that operate in the foreign
markets, whereas there are many registered associations with a total of
several hundred members in the United States, as I understand it. Way
back in 1960, antitrust policy in the United States was relatively negative
to the export cartels. However, the growth of foreign demand for goods
and services worldwide and the increase in import competition in many
domestic markets made it clear that a major source of future economic
growth in the United States would come from increased exports. The
attention paid to exports was reflected in the Export Trading Company
Act of 1982. That Act permitted an export trading company to be law-
fully formed so long as it was not likely to have substantial anti-competi-
tive effects within the United States.22 This new U.S. law has taken the
registration provisions away from the antitrust enforcement people and
allowed the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Attor-
ney General, to issue a certificate of review that provides significant pro-
tection from antitrust suits against specified export conduct which meet
certain statutory standards. The only limitation is that the exemption
will not apply where there is a direct, substantial and reasonably forsee-
able effect on commerce in the United States. The concept in Canada is
merely a defense to a combined prosecution. The much more sophisti-
cated approach of the United States would be an important advance for
Canadian exporters and I cannot discern why, when the statute was
amended in 1986, the registration concept was ignored.
21 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
22 Margulies, U.S. Export Conduct Under U.S. Antitrust Law, FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST.
(1984); Fox, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust-is 'Reasonableness' the Answer?, FORDHAM CoRP. L.
INST. 51, 62 if. (1986).
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Furthermore, certification in the United States can remove antitrust
uncertainty in "gray-area" cases by allowing an exporter the opportunity
to confirm the often qualified conclusions of counsel that particular ex-
port conduct is not likely to violate the antitrust laws. There has been
some focus on the problems of free riding23 in the United States and
much sophisticated debate in the learned literature. None of that debate
has trickled over the border into Canada as yet.
Shortly put, while the Canadian statute has an export exemption
from the conspiracy offences and the policy of Canada is clearly to en-
courage Canadian exports abroad (even if based on conduct that would
be illegal at home) there is no sophisticated jurisprudence or academic
writing relating to the whole area. There is no registration of export car-
tels and no safeguards that pop out automatically if one is registered.
This may be surprising when one recognizes the extent of Canada's de-
pendence of export trade, but one must also recognize that Canada has
had a relatively ineffective antitrust policy throughout its history. The
lack of activity in the export exemption is just a natural corollary to the
general theorem.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET DEFINITION
IN MERGER ANALYSIS
The new merger provisions in the Competition Act in Canada make
no reference to the word "Canada," a noticeable change from the earlier
provisions. A merger is defined to be the acquisition of control of a sig-
nificant interest in the whole or a part of the business of a competitor,
supplier, customer or other person. The Tribunal must find that the pro-
posed merger prevents or is likely to lessen competition substantially
among the outlets in which the trade or industry operates before it can
enter a conviction. In the section setting out the factors which the Tribu-
nal must consider, the first one is the extent to which foreign products or
foreign competitors are likely to provide effective competition to the busi-
ness of the parties involved in the merger or proposed merger. This is a
clear recognition of the globalization of markets which has been com-
mented on so often in the literature.2 4
The current structure of merger proceedings in Canada is unlikely
to result in any judicial determination of market boundaries in the geo-
graphical sense. This is because the Director of Investigation and Re-
search has made it clear that he will not resort to the Tribunal except in
extreme circumstances. He proposes to negotiate most mergers to a con-
clusion acceptable to the parties or issue a challenge that will, in most
cases, deter the businessman from going ahead with the proposed ven-
ture. Accordingly, one should not anticipate Canadian jurisprudence to
23 Hilke, Free Trading or Free Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available Empirical
Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 32W. COMP. 75 (1988).
24 J. ORDOVER, TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST AND ECONOMICS 233 (1984).
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clarify any of the merger provisions within the next ten to twenty years.
By that time the economy will have changed and we will be back to
wondering what the statute means. However, it is most instructive for
Canadians to recognize that there are decisions of external Tribunals
which lend credence to the view that markets do not have to be seen as
Canada only. Thus, for example, in de Laval-Stork2" the European
Commission decided that the market for steam turbines, pumps and
compressors encompassed at least the European Community, the re-
mainder of Europe, the Near East and South Africa, if it did not encom-
pass the entire world. Similarly, in a 1975 decision the European
Commission stated that the market for reprocessing of nuclear fuel in-
cluded the nine European Community nations plus nine additional Euro-
pean countries.26
In my experience, the approach of the antitrust authorities can lead
firms to abandon merger plans. This is also true in the European context
where the uncertainties of rebutting a presumption of market domination
make it difficult for firms to predict accurately the likelihood of obtaining
antitrust approval for specific concentrative activities. The point is that
the effect of a limited evaluation of geographic markets is often one
method to encourage a subtle prohibition of merger activity. Firms are
considerably less willing to spend funds on merger activity when faced
with an unquantifiable risk of the merger being prohibited and perhaps
sanctions being imposed. The Canadian literature in this area is scant
indeed, but the Bureau of Competition Policy is considering the impact
of international markets. The fact is that in many international markets
it is unlikely that Canada can have more than one competitor. This al-
ways seems to be disastrous when one looks only at the domestic market,
especially if there is some sort of unstated preference for the Canadian
producer. Thus, one often sees in Canada a high domestic concentration
which militates against any finding of adequate competition existing in
the markets.
From an economic point of view, it seems clear that market defini-
tion should be merely an aid for determining whether market power ex-
ists. Thus, to define a market in geographic terms is to say that if prices
were appreciably raised or volume curtailed for the product within a
given area, supply from other sources could or could not be expected to
enter promptly enough to restore the old price or volume.28 However, as
Posner has noticed, this approach has not been used by the courts, per-
haps because of a lack of confidence in our ability to measure elastici-
ties.29 The general recognition of market power as the key factor in the
25 11 O.J. EUR. COMM. 215 (1977).
26 United Reprocessors, GmbH., 7 O.J. EUR. COMM. 51 (1976).
27 Oliver, Internationalizing Markets-Effects on German Competition Policy and Law, 32 W.
COMP. 19 (1988).
28 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 41 (1979).
29 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 125 (1976).
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economic literature has led only to extensive legal consideration of the
market definition problem in transnational mergers.30 Whether or not
we will find an analysis of market power starting to emerge in Canada
remains to be seen. Certainly, from a practitioner's point of view, the
extensive literature abroad will help us in convincing our regulatory au-
thorities that the geographic market needs to be considered in the world
context in many industries.
IV. CONCLUSION
Canadian experience in examining antitrust issues in export markets
or international markets is very limited indeed. While the statute is hos-
pitable to export cartels and the possibility of international market defini-
tions in merger cases, Canadian law has been generally hostile to an
overreaching approach to the extraterritorial effect of antitrust. All this,
however, is in the context of very few judicial pronouncements and even
less serious scholarly writing. The history of Canadian antitrust has been
to borrow most ideas from the United States, and I am sure we will find
much reference to U.S. source documents in submissions made to the
Bureau of Competition Policy, although probably without attribution. It
is interesting to note how far advanced the European Community is in
this regard, as Canada likes to think that it has a European perspective as
well as a North American one.
30 BAKER, MARKET DEFINITION OF TRANSNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES, MERGERS AND MO-
NOPOLIZATION 115 (1984).
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